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This report provides insights into the current trade relations between the EU and Mercosur and 
assesses impacts of a comprehensive trade agreement between the two blocs on the Dutch agrifood 
sector. Trade opportunities of Dutch fruit & vegetables and dairy products would expand if an 
agreement would reduce the currently high trade costs related to divergent non-tariff measures, such 
as pest risk analysis procedures and labelling requirements. Beef and poultry supply from Mercosur is 
very competitive and is expected to gain from any improved access to EU markets, resulting in more 
competitive pressure for the Dutch industry on its main markets. 
 
Dit rapport biedt een overzicht van de huidige handelsrelaties van de EU met Mercosur en maakt een 
inschatting van de gevolgen van een handelsakkoord tussen beide blokken voor de Nederlandse agro-
sector. Voor de Nederlandse voedingstuinbouw en zuivelsector ontstaan exportkansen als een akkoord 
de kosten terugdringt die voortkomen uit verschillen in zogenoemde non-tarifaire maatregelen 
(bijvoorbeeld procedures om plantziekterisico’s te voorkomen, of labeleisen). Het aanbod van rund- en 
pluimveevlees uit Mercosur is sterk competitief. Een verruiming van de toegang tot de EU-markt zal 
betekenen dat de Nederlandse vleesindustrie meer concurrentie krijgt op haar belangrijkste 
afzetmarkten. 
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 Preface 
The EU and Mercosur - the South American customs union comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and since 2012 Venezuela - are considering to reignite the talks about a trade agreement 
between the two blocs. Negotiations for a trade deal started in 1999 and were suspended in 2004 
when the two sides were unable to reach an agreement regarding agricultural trade liberalisation. 
Negotiations were re-started in 2010 yet without any follow-up since the last negotiation round took 
place in October 2012. In Spring 2014 Mercosur countries indicated to be ready for a next round in 
which they would like to exchange market access offers. Negotiators announced to plan for meetings 
to discuss new proposals by late autumn 2014. These signals instigated this study. However, at the 
closing of this report in February 2015 no new round of negotiations had started. 
 
This report offers insights into the current trade relations between the EU and Mercosur and 
bottlenecks to enhance these relations in agriculture and food. Trade costs in terms of administrative 
(border) measures and other ‘behind-the-border’ measures related, among others, to food safety and 
environmental protection are significant. Trade opportunities, therefore, may increase if these barriers 
are reduced. The Dutch agrifood sector, with its strong orientation on trade, may gain if regulatory 
divergences that exist between the EU and Mercosur countries will be addressed. However, more open 
borders will also imply more competition from Mercosur agrifood companies on the Dutch and EU 
market. 
 
The study has been commissioned and financed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the valuable comments on earlier drafts of the report of Mr. Jochem Porte and 
Mr. Gijs Zeestraten, both at the ELV-department of DG Agro. A special thanks goes to the business 
representative Inge Ribbens (FrugiVenta), Jan Maarten Vrij (NZO), Wim Kloosterboer (KFC) and 
Frans van Dongen (CVO) for their sharing their expertise on the matter. LEI colleague 
Gerdien Meijerink is also thanked for her comments and suggestions on the final draft. 
 
 
 
Ms. L.C. van Staalduinen  
Managing Director 
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 Summary 
S.1 Key findings 
Non-tariff barriers are reducing opportunities to trade between the EU and Mercosur countries. The 
Dutch agrifood sector, most particularly producers of fruit & vegetables and dairy, are interested to 
export to Mercosur but onerous and time consuming procedures to get export approval hinder efforts 
to seize these opportunities. 
 
The Dutch meat industry, currently protected by import tariffs and tariff-rate quotas, would face 
increased competition from Mercosur suppliers at the EU market in case market access is liberalised 
and the meat industry in Mercosur countries is able to further enhance its capacity to comply with the 
EU’s food safety standards. 
S.2 Complementary findings 
Trade flows between the EU and Mercosur are particularly unequal, which means that interests in 
negotiations to liberalise bilateral trade are asymmetric. Exports from the EU to Mercosur consist 
largely of industrial goods whereas EU imports from Mercosur are dominated by agricultural products. 
Agricultural trade relations of the EU and the Netherlands with Mercosur countries are extremely 
lopsided, with imports far exceeding the value of exports to Mercosur, indicating Mercosur has a 
comparative advantage in agriculture and food products. 
 
Literature on the impacts of trade liberalisation scenarios generally arrive at similar conclusions on the 
positive economic impacts on both sides, with - in terms of GDP growth - more positive estimates for 
Mercosur than for the EU. The economic losses and the adjustment pressures arising from a bilateral 
trade agreement between the EU and the countries of Mercosur would, as far as the EU is concerned, 
fall very heavily on the agricultural sector. Within the agricultural sector, effects of a bilateral trade 
agreement are negative for EU producers of meat (particularly beef, but also poultry), sugar and 
dairy, and some types of fruit and vegetables. The largest export gains are estimated for EU’s olive 
and olive oil sector. 
 
Most assessments of trade liberalisation impacts do not take non-tariff barriers into account, even 
though these reduce opportunities to trade between the EU and Mercosur countries in important ways. 
For example, Mercosur ranks poorly in several indices (trade enabling, ease of doing business, global 
competitiveness) and the costs to import are relatively high due to time consuming customs 
procedures, and the quality of infrastructure and institutions dealing with imports and exports. 
 
Trade cost equivalents of Mercosur NTMs are particularly serious for EU exports of beverages, 
livestock and vegetables and fruits. Trade costs faced by Mercosur exporters crossing the EU border 
are high too for fruits, dairy, sugar and beverages. These estimates indicate that NTM trade costs are 
an important factor in bilateral agricultural trade between the EU and Mercosur. 
 
This is also emphasised in the three case studies in this report. The procedure to complete a Pest Risk 
Analysis (PRA) to get export approval is rather time consuming and a major bottleneck for Dutch fruit 
and vegetables to enter the Mercosur market. An FTA should contribute to a much smoother PRA 
process. Dutch exporters of pears do see opportunities in Brazil and now that Brazil has approved the 
export certificate procedure for Dutch pears per 20 January 2015 these opportunities may be 
explored. Other fruit traders are also actively looking for more opportunities to import a range of fruits 
from Mercosur to source the EU and beyond. 
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Dairy export to Mercosur is hindered by strict labelling requirements and Brazil’s export listing system 
that requires detailed inspections at the companies’ premises. The EU/Dutch dairy industry believes 
that a trade agreement would improve export opportunities to a growing market for dairy products. 
 
Brazil (beef, pork and poultry) and Argentina (beef and poultry) are strong players in the international 
meat markets (with Uruguay and Paraguay strong beef exporters), and are more competitive 
compared to EU suppliers in terms of price and quality. A further reduction of EU import tariffs and/or 
increase of tariff-rate quotas would result in increased competition from Mercosur suppliers at the EU 
market. This will be even more so if the meat industry in Mercosur countries is able to further enhance 
its capacity to comply with EU’s food safety standards. 
S.3 Method 
This report was commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The report’s main objective is to 
provide insights into the impacts of a future trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur countries 
on selected Dutch agrifood sectors and subsectors and for specific products. The study is based on a 
literature review, statistical analyses of trade and food industry data, and on interviews with business 
representatives to obtain insight into the major barriers to trade and the industry’s view on offensive 
and defensive interests. 
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 Samenvatting 
S.1 Belangrijkste uitkomsten 
Niet-tarifaire maatregelen belemmeren de handel tussen de EU en de Mercosur-landen. De 
Nederlandse agrofoodsector, vooral de voedingstuinbouw en de zuivelsector, is geïnteresseerd om 
naar Mercosur te exporteren maar lastige en tijdrovende exportprocedures vormen een belangrijk 
knelpunt om de mogelijkheden te realiseren. 
 
De Nederlandse vleessector, op dit moment nog beschermd door importtarieven en tariefquota’s, zou 
een toename van de concurrentie op de EU-markt ondervinden van aanbieders uit Mercosurlanden als 
de markttoegang wordt verruimd en de vleesindustrie van de Mercosurlanden haar vermogen om te 
voldoen aan de EU-standaarden op het gebied van voedselveiligheid verder versterkt.  
S.2 Overige uitkomsten 
Handelsstromen tussen de EU en Mercosur zijn zeer ongelijk, waardoor de belangen in de 
onderhandelingen om de toegang tot elkaars markten te verruimen asymmetrisch zijn. Export van de 
EU naar Mercosur bestaat vooral uit industriegoederen, terwijl de invoer van de EU uit Mercosur wordt 
gedomineerd door agrarische producten. De agrarische handelsrelaties van de EU en van Nederland 
zijn zeer scheef, waarbij de invoerwaarde die van de export ver overstijgt, wat aangeeft dat Mercosur 
een comparatief voordeel heeft in landbouwproducten.  
 
Studies over de gevolgen van handelsliberalisatiescenario’s komen over het algemeen allemaal tot de 
conclusie dat deze in termen van het Bruto Nationaal Product positief zijn, met hogere groeicijfers 
voor Mercosur dan voor de EU. De economische nadelen en de noodzakelijke aanpassingen als gevolg 
van een bilateraal akkoord tussen de EU en de landen van Mercosur zullen, wat de EU betreft, vooral 
voor rekening van de agrarische sector zijn. Binnen de agrarische sector zijn de gevolgen negatief 
voor de EU-producenten van vlees (met name rundvlees, maar ook pluimveevlees), suiker en zuivel, 
en sommige fruit en groente. De grootste exportvoordelen worden verwacht voor de EU’s 
olijfoliesector.  
 
De meeste studies over de gevolgen van handelsliberalisatie houden geen rekening met non-tarifaire 
belemmeringen, hoewel juist deze de handel tussen de EU en Mercosur sterk beïnvloeden. Dat blijkt 
bijvoorbeeld uit de lage score van Mercosurlanden op diverse ranglijsten (‘open voor handel’, ‘gemak 
waarmee zaken kunnen worden gedaan’, ‘mondiale concurrentiekracht’) en de hoge importkosten 
vanwege tijdrovende grensprocedures en de kwaliteit van infrastructuur en bij de in- en 
uitvoerafhandeling betrokken instituties.  
 
Berekende handelskosten van NTM's van Mercosur zijn relatief hoog voor de EU-export van dranken, 
dierlijke producten en groente en fruit. Handelskosten voor exporteurs uit Mercosur die de Europese 
markt op willen zijn hoog voor fruit, zuivel, suiker en dranken. Deze berekeningen duiden erop dat 
NTM's een belangrijke factor zijn in de bilaterale handel tussen de EU en Mercosur. 
 
Dat wordt ook duidelijk in de drie casestudies van dit rapport. De procedures rond een PRA 
(plantenziekterisicoanalyse) die voorafgaat aan de verlening van een exportvergunning nemen veel 
tijd in beslag en hinderen Nederlandse groente en fruit om op de Mercosurmarkt komen. Een 
vrijhandelsakkoord zou voor een veel soepeler verloop van de PRA-procedure moeten zorgen. 
Nederlandse exporteurs van peren zien kansen op de Braziliaanse markt nu Brazilië een 
exportcertificeringsprocedure voor dit product per 20 januari 2015 heeft goedgekeurd. Andere 
LEI Report 2015-036 | 9 
 
fruithandelaren zijn actief op zoek naar mogelijkheden om fruit uit Mercosurlanden te importeren en 
de Europese en andere markten ermee te bedienen. 
 
De export van zuivel vanuit de EU naar Mercosur wordt bemoeilijkt door de strenge etiketteringseisen 
en het Braziliaanse systeem van exportlijsten dat gepaard gaat met gedetailleerd fabrieksinspecties. 
De EU-/Nederlandse zuivelindustrie is van mening dat een handelsakkoord met Mercosur haar 
exportmogelijkheden vergroot naar deze groeiende markt voor zuivelproducten. 
 
Brazilië en Argentinië zijn sterke spelers op de internationale vleesmarkten (met Uruguay en Paraguay 
met name sterk bij export van rundvlees), en concurrerend ten opzichte van EU-aanbieders op zowel 
prijs als kwaliteit. Een verdere vermindering van de Europese importtarieven en/of verruiming van de 
tariefquota resulteert in een toename van de concurrentie van aanbieders uit Mercosurlanden op de 
Europese markt. Dat zal in versterkte mate het geval zijn als de vleesindustrie in de Mercosurlanden in 
staat is te voldoen aan alle voedselveiligheidseisen van de EU. 
S.3 Methode 
Dit rapport is geschreven in opdracht van het Ministerie van Economische Zaken. De belangrijkste 
doelstelling van het rapport is om inzicht te geven in de gevolgen van een toekomstig handelsakkoord 
tussen de EU en de lidstaten van Mercosur voor een aantal agrarische sectoren en producten. De 
studie is gebaseerd op literatuuronderzoek en analyses van handels- en sectordata, en maakt gebruikt 
van interviews met vertegenwoordigers van de sectoren om inzichten te krijgen in de belangrijkste 
knelpunten bij internationale handel en de visies van het bedrijfsleven over de offensieve en 
defensieve belangen van de sector. 
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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and aim of the study 
The EU and Mercosur (the South American customs union comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, and since 2012 Venezuela) are considering to reignite the talks on a trade agreement 
between the two blocs.1 Negotiations for a trade deal started in 1999 and were suspended in 2004 
when the two sides were unable to reach an agreement regarding agricultural trade liberalisation. 
Negotiations were re-started in 2010 yet without any follow-up since the last negotiation round took 
place in October 2012. In spring 2014 Mercosur countries indicated to be ready for a next round in 
which they would like to exchange market access offers. Negotiators announced to plan for meetings 
to discuss new proposals by late autumn 2014. However, at the closing of this report in February 2015 
no new round of negotiations has started. 
 
This study provides insights into the current trade relations in agrifood products between the EU and 
Mercosur, and assesses the trade impacts of a comprehensive trade agreement between the two 
blocs. This study addresses the impacts of a trade agreement from the EU’s export and import 
perspective, with specific attention to the impacts on the position of the Dutch agrifood sectors. The 
study offers an overview of quantitative effects of a trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur 
and uses case studies on fruit and vegetables, dairy and meat to evaluate offensive and defensive 
interests of the Dutch agrifood sector in these trade negotiations. The agrifood sector is an important 
industry for the EU in terms of added value and value of exports. Agriculture and its related processing 
and distribution sectors are a major component of each of the Mercosur economies in terms of income 
and employment. Both sides have complained about the many regulatory hurdles exporters are facing 
when entering each other’s market. Both partners expect to gain from regulatory alignment. The 
Dutch agrifood sector, with its strong orientation on trade, may gain if current regulatory divergences 
between the EU and Mercosur member states are addressed. This study shows which non-tariff 
measures most significantly affect trade in agrifood commodities and products relevant to the Dutch 
agribusiness. At the same time, more open borders will also imply increased competition from 
suppliers from Mercosur on the Dutch and EU markets.  
1.2 Approach and structure of the report 
For analytical purposes the main research question of the possible impact of a EU Mercosur trade 
agreement in agricultural and food products is split into a subset of questions and tasks that are 
elaborated in the following sections of the report. 
 
Chapter 2 presents current and past trade flows and market positions. This part of the analysis 
provides insights into and explanations of major trends and structural features of bilateral trade flows 
between the EU/the Netherlands and Mercosur as a bloc and its four individual members. We show the 
relative importance of agrifood products in the overall bilateral trade, indicating the interest each of 
the parties engaged in the negotiations may have in improving market access for agrifood products. In 
our description of trade flows, specific attention is given to agrifood products that are (or would be) of 
interest to the Netherlands in its bilateral trade relation with Mercosur countries. 
 
Chapter 3 of the study focuses on current trade conditions. Conditions discussed are tariffs and non-
tariff measures (NTMs), such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and Technical Barriers to 
1
  Note that Venezuela officially joined Mercosur in July 2012 but does not join Mercosur’s negotiations on a trade agreement 
with the EU. Therefore, this report considers Mercosur to encompass Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
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Trade (TBT) measures, besides ‘non-technical’ NTMs such as licences and import quotas. In addition, 
with increasing trade linkages and globalisation, sustainability issues arise, which in the context of 
trade are defined as non-trade concerns. These concerns relate to environmental protection, and 
respect for labour conditions and animal welfare. Measures like the EU nitrate directive or the ban on 
the ‘battery’ cage for egg laying hens increase production costs at EU farm and supply chain level, and 
hence affect the industry’s competitiveness and trade opportunities. A comparison of NTMs and 
measures reflecting non-trade concerns (such as animal welfare and farm labour circumstances) that 
affect the sector’s competitive position is made between the EU and (major players in) Mercosur: their 
differences are specified to the extent possible and their divergences from international standards 
(e.g. in the Codex Alimentarius) are evaluated. Main sources of this analysis are EU and UN trade 
databases, plus WTO, FAO and EU/national documents that include tariffs and non-tariff measures. 
From this, the NTMs that affect trade will be listed, which are relevant to better understand the 
bilateral trade relations between the EU and Mercosur. 
 
The two next chapters of the report discuss the possible effects of a trade agreement between 
Mercosur and the EU. We have no cause to add another scenario to those already analysed in the 
literature as there is currently no ongoing negotiation process that has led to a concrete proposal. 
Therefore, chapter 4 reviews the already significant body of literature that evaluates quantitatively the 
impacts of possible trade agreement scenarios. This review is expanded with an analysis of trade costs 
caused by customs procedures and other border administration, and NTMs like product standards and 
conformity assessment regulations.  
 
In Chapter 5 we present three sector case studies; one on fruit and vegetables, dairy and meat. These 
case studies zoom in on the offensive and defensive interests of these sectors in the EU negotiations 
with Mercosur on a trade agreement. We highlight factors that currently hamper exports and estimate 
expected benefits of eliminating trade barriers. We then discuss defensive interests and indicate 
possible implications of further increasing market access to the EU. 
 
Chapter 6 of the report summarises its main findings. 
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 2 Trade flows and trade conditions 
2.1 Introduction 
Main features of EU-Mercosur bilateral trade flows are presented in Table 2.1. The figures show that 
exports from EU to Mercosur are largely industrial products whereas EU imports from Mercosur are 
dominated by agricultural products. These trade characteristics reflect the relative strengths of the 
economies at both sides. Given the agricultural competitiveness of Brazil and Argentina, the two 
dominant Mercosur partners, the EU is reluctant to open its market for agricultural products whereas 
Mercosur countries hesitate to open their economies for manufactured goods from abroad (Mercosur 
Press, 13 August 2014). These concerns at both sides constitute a main bottleneck to reaching an 
agreement about free(r) trade. 
 
 
Table 2.1  
Structure of EU27/28 export and import with Mercosur countries, 2013. 
 Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Argentina M4 total 
 Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import 
Values in billion euro (unless stated otherwise; m=million) 
Industrial 
products 
36.1 17.6 470m 108m 1.5 0.6 9.4 2.2 47.4 20.5 
Agricultural 
products 1 
1.4 13.1 82m 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.2 5.2 1.9 20.0 
Share in total exports or imports (%) 
Industrial 
products 
96 57 90 9 91 46 98 30 96 51 
Agricultural 
products 
4 43 10 91 9 54 2 70 5 49 
Source: Eurostat COMEXT. Note 1: The definition ‘Agricultural products’ used for this table includes the chapters 1-24 (excluding fish and fish 
products) of the Harmonised System (HS). 
 
 
The following subsections present overall trends in and characteristics of the Dutch and EU bilateral 
agrifood trade relations with Mercosur countries. Note that the report shows only concise overviews or 
detailed trade figures for specific categories referring to recent years only. An earlier LEI report 
(Rutten et al., 2011) presents broad overviews of bilateral trade data up to 2010.  
2.2 Trends and importance  
Figure 2.1 shows how extremely lopsided agricultural trade relations of the EU and the Netherlands 
are with the four Mercosur countries: EU and Dutch imports from Mercosur countries far exceed the 
value of exports to Mercosur. EU imports (blue bar in the figure) amounted to around €20bn in recent 
years, whereas EU exports (green bar) are increasing but remain just below €2bn in 2013.2 Dutch 
exports to Mercosur are a modest €0.3bn in 2013, yet showing a tendency to grow quickly in recent 
years; the 2007-2011 average was €0.2bn. Dutch imports (pale grey line in the figure) show an 
increase over the whole period, from around €3bn in the early 2000s up to over €5.5bn in 2013.  
2
  Of which €1.4bn to Brazil, €0.2bn to Argentina, €0.2bn to Uruguay and €0.1bn to Paraguay. 
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To put these figures in perspective: the value of EU27 trade with third countries is up to €150bn in 
exports and €138bn in imports. The share of trade with Mercosur in exports and imports equals 2.5% 
and 16% respectively. For the Netherlands, Mercosur is an even more important supplier of imports as 
23% of Dutch imports from third countries has its origin in one of these Latin American countries. 
Dutch export to Mercosur is a modest 2.2% of its total agricultural export to third countries. These 
figures show the importance of Mercosur as the source of agrifood commodities and products for the 
EU market in general and for the Dutch agrifood sector in particular.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1  Bilateral agricultural trade of the EU and the Netherlands with Mercosur countries (total 
agricultural exports and imports in billion euros; EU trade figures on the left axis, Dutch trade figures 
on the right axis. Agricultural products include chapter HS01-24, excluding 03). 
 
2.3 Structure of the Dutch bilateral agrifood trade flows 
with Mercosur 
Figure 2.2 shows the structure of the Dutch exports to and imports from the Mercosur Four. The most 
important export products are preparations of vegetable and fruits (18% of total exports to Mercosur 
countries) and a category ‘miscellaneous edible preparations’ (even at 8-digit product detail - HS 
21069098 - it is not clear what kind of products these are). Beverages, animal fodder (including 
preparations used in animal fodder) and oilseeds (seeds, fruits and spores for sowing) follow in 
importance. On the import side, animal fodder (oilcakes resulting from the extraction of soya-bean 
oil), oilseeds (soya beans) and meat (bovine meat, and meat and edible offal) are the most important 
product groups.  
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Figure 2.2  Structure of the Dutch agrifood exports (left) to and imports (right) from Mercosur- 
countries, 2013 (% of total Dutch agrifood export and import value) 
 
 
A comparison of the current structure of Dutch exports to Mercosur with the set of exports of the 
Netherlands to third countries (i.e. exports to all countries outside the EU) allows us to indicate which 
products dominate exports in the exports to Mercosur and which have a (much) less strong position in 
the export flow to Mercosur (see Figure A1 in Appendix 1 to be compared with Figure 2.2). The 
products with a relatively small share in trade with Mercosur are dairy products, live trees and other 
plants, vegetables, and preparations of cereals. Much better represented are milling industry products, 
preparations of vegetables and fruit, the ‘miscellaneous edible products’ group and animal fodder. The 
reasons for these differences may be related to market demand and competitiveness (related to 
preferences, prices, quality), but might also be related to market access issues hindering products 
from entering the Mercosur market. Products listed as less well represented in exports with Mercosur 
will receive extra attention in our further analysis of barriers to trade. 
 
2.4 Agrifood trade profiles of Mercosur countries 
Before analysing trade conditions affecting the EU-Mercosur bilateral trade relations, this subsection 
first shows the trade profiles of Mercosur countries in agrifood products. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay are net exporters of agricultural products, with Argentina and Brazil showing a rather 
large trade surplus (Figure 2.3 below). Exports of the four countries are particularly dominated by the 
soya complex (beans, oil and oilcake): about half of Argentina’s and Brazil’s exports is related to these 
products and for Paraguay it is even 60%. Uruguay’s main export products are soya beans and bovine 
meat.3  
 
Compared to their export flows, imports are quite modest for each of the four net exporting countries. 
The major items that are imported are fruits and cocoa products by Argentina, cereals and fish by 
Brazil, cereals and beverages by Paraguay and cereals and oilcakes by Uruguay. Imports are mainly 
sourced from the region: roughly half of Brazil’s and Argentina’s import is from neighbouring 
countries, whereas Paraguay and Uruguay import 60-70% from the two large neighbours Argentina 
and Brazil. Brazil’s imports from the US and the EU are around 15% each (as share of total 
3
  Venezuela – not shown in the overviews here as it does not join the trade negotiations with the EU - is a net-importer of 
agrifood products, importing mainly live (bovine) animals, meat, cereals and oilcakes. 
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agricultural imports); Argentina’s imports from the US and the EU are 8% and 13% respectively, while 
Paraguay and Uruguay import more than 3-5% from the US and the EU. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Total agrifood exports and imports of Mercosur countries (in billion USD, 2013. 
Agricultural products include chapter HS01-24, excluding 03). Source UNCOMTRADE.  
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 3 Trade conditions in bilateral trade 
relations between the EU and 
Mercosur 
3.1 Tariffs  
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the protection rates of each of the four Mercosur countries and the 
EU. The duties referred to in the column ‘Total’ are an average of all products covered under HS 
chapter 01-97. The chapters 01-24 relate to ‘Agriculture’. The tariff profiles presented in the table 
refer to schedules for 2012 (simple average) and 2011 (trade weighted average). 
 
 
Table 3.1  
Applied MFN tariff profiles of Mercosur countries and the EU: simple average (S) and trade weighted 
(TW) average (in %). 
 Total Agriculture Non-agriculture 
 S TW S TW S TW 
Argentina 12.5 12.2 10.5 11.8 12.8 12.3 
Brazil 13.5 10.2 10.1 12.0 14.1 10.1 
Paraguay 10.1 6.6 10.0 12.7 10.2 6.1 
Uruguay 10.5 8.5 9.8 11.3 10.6 8.1 
EU 5.5 2.7 13.1 8.6 4.2 2.3 
Source: WTO ITC UNCTAD, World tariff Profiles 2013. 
 
 
Figures in Table 3.1 show that:  
• Overall, Mercosur countries have higher tariffs than the EU (calculated as ‘simple’ and ‘trade 
weighted’ average, see column ‘Total’); 
• EU tariffs on agricultural products are relatively high in simple average terms (column S under 
‘Agriculture’), but as the EU imports almost 50% of its agricultural imports duty-free (and each of 
the Mercosur countries imports only a very small percentage of their agricultural imports duty-free), 
the trade weighted average is below those of the Mercosur countries; 
• EU tariffs on industrial goods are far below those in each Mercosur country. 
 
Recent changes in EU’s General System of Preferences (GSP) import policy have had consequences for 
the Mercosur countries Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela as they are classified as high middle-
income countries. As of 1 January 2014, these countries will no longer benefit from any preferential 
regime upon importation into the EU. Paraguay is still eligible to GSP rates. 
Table 3.2 presents the tariff structure of agricultural products in more detail for Brazil and the EU, 
allowing for a more specific reading of the current state of tariff protection on both sides. This 
overview indicates that: 
• Average ad valorem tariffs applied (column 3) by Brazil are higher than EU tariffs except for HS 11 
(milling industry products), HS 16 (meat preparations) HS 19 (preparations of vegetables and fruits) 
and HS24 (tobacco); 
• Brazil is not applying any specific tariff (absolute amount per kg), while the EU does for many 
products, such as for meat (186 tariff lines out of the 248 are linked to a specific rate), dairy 
(161 tariff lines out of the 172 tariff lines) and many other products - see column 6 in the table). 
 
The tariff profiles for agricultural products for Argentina and Brazil are almost equal (at 6 digit level) - 
differences are at the tariff line coffee (Argentina has higher tariffs) and preparations of cereal 
products (Argentina has lower tariffs than Brazil). Also, Argentina does not apply specific tariffs on 
agricultural products. 
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 Table 3.2  
Brazil and EU applied ad valorem tariffs imposed on agricultural products, average at 2-digit level, 
(2013 data). 
 Brazil applied tariffs  EU applied tariffs 
HS code 
description 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
01 Live animals 45 45 2.3 4 34.3 0  65 33 1.2 11.5 55.6 32 
02 Meat 74 74 9.9 12 0.0 0  248 62 5.1 15.4 19.1 186 
03 Fish 48 48 14.9 28 6.3 0  434 434 10.9 26 8.5 0 
04 Dairy 28 28 6.4 8 17.3 0  172 11 5.8 17.3 5.7 161 
05 Products of 
animal origin 
23 23 5.9 10 17.2 0  20 20 0.1 5.1 98.3 0 
06 Live trees etc. 93 93 9.2 35 13.2 0  55 55 7.1 12 13.3 0 
07 Vegetables 74 74 10.2 55 0.0 0  122 94 8.5 15.2 14.4 28 
08 Fruits 45 45 10.0 10 0.0 0  136 112 5.9 20.8 20.1 24 
09 Coffee, tea etc. 41 41 5.1 12 43.6 0  50 50 2.3 12.5 68.2 0 
10 Cereals 30 30 10.3 14 0.0 0  62 7 5.4 12.8 6.7 55 
11 Milling industry 63 63 4.9 10 39.6 0  71 6 12.2 19.2 0.0 65 
12 Oilseeds 23 23 7.5 14 0.0 0  74 71 1.2 8.3 73.1 3 
13 Lacs, gums etc. 7 7 6.0 6 0.0 0  14 14 2.3 19.2 66.7 0 
14 Vegetable 
plaiting materials 
71 71 9.4 30 0.0 0  5 5 0.0 0 100 0 
15 Fats and oils 15 15 16.0 16 0.0 0  128 117 5.4 16 21.5 11 
16 Meat prep. 23 23 16.5 20 0.0 0  96 77 17.6 26 2.4 19 
17 Sugars etc. 13 13 15.1 20 0.0 0  44 3 11.4 13.4 0.0 41 
18 Cocoa and prep. 27 27 16.6 18 0.0 0  27 7 6.1 9.6 18.2 20 
19 Prep of cereals 61 61 15.1 55 0.0 0  51 2 10.7 12.8 0.0 49 
20 Prep. Veg. & 
fruits 
39 39 15.3 18 0.0 0  304 229 17.5 33.6 0.7 75 
21 Misc. ed. Prep.  31 31 19.4 27 3.8 0  39 23 9.3 14.7 9.4 16 
22 Beverages 33 33 6.1 14 0.0 0  303 58 3.9 32 41.9 245 
23 Residues etc. 19 19 17.1 20 0.0 0  64 32 0.8 12 68.8 32 
24 Tobacco 45 45 2.3 4 34.3 0  21 10 44.7 74.9 0.0 11 
Notes to the table:  
1) Number of bound tariff lines in the HS code;  
2) Number of national tariff lines in the HS code with ad valorem duty;  
3) Average of all ad valorem duties in the HS code. Ad valorem equivalents for non-ad valorem duties are not included;  
4) Maximum ad valorem duty in the HS code;  
5) Percentage of duty free bound national tariff lines in the HS code; 
6) Number of tariff lines in the HS code with non-ad valorem duty. 
Source: WTO Tariff download facility at www.tariffdata.wto.org. 
 
 
The true tariff average may be significantly higher than indicated by the figures in the table above 
because the EU charges specific tariffs on many tariff lines. In short, by looking at averages only, one 
easily underestimates the impact tariff elimination may have on trade flows at a more detailed level. 
Indeed, behind these averages, ad valorem duties for detailed products stretch over a wide range, and 
hence their elimination would have different impacts on import prices and a different impact on 
market access. Moreover, many products are subject to specific duties which can be significant in 
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terms of share of the ultimate import price.4 This means that assessments of impacts of tariff 
liberalisation on aggregated product levels are indicative at the most. 
3.2 NTMs - what is at stake between the EU and Mercosur 
countries? 
The overview of tariffs presented above masks the complexity of market access as there are 
numerous non-tariff measures (NTMs) that affect trade. NTMs can be manifest in sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures, besides ‘non-technical’ 
measures such as licences and import quotas.5 This subsection refers to and discusses some of the 
trade affecting measures that are classified as SPS and TBT measures that are most relevant to better 
understand the bilateral trade relations between the EU and the Mercosur. In presenting this, we take 
the EU perspective, arguing that the information more or less represents the perspective of the 
Netherlands, being part of the EU.  
 
Van Wagenberg et al. (2012) compares standards imposed on agricultural production in the EU in food 
safety (e.g. hygiene requirements, constraints that limit the use of hormones, animal identification 
and registration requirements), environment (e.g. protection of groundwater, quality of water, air and 
soil), animal welfare (e.g. housing conditions), and other nontrade concerns (e.g. rules to prevent 
contagious animal and plant diseases, requirements on labour conditions) with similar standards 
imposed on domestic production in the selected countries. One of the selected countries is Brazil, 
which includes case studies on pork, poultry meat and cereals. The comparative analysis of EU 
standards in these areas shows several differences with those applied in Brazil, as is summarised in 
Table 3.3. below. The most significant differences appear to be in the area of food safety where 
standards divert (e.g. on which veterinary medicines and feedstuff additive are allowed). The EU GM 
approval procedures are not synchronised with Brazil’s and standards are not enforced in Brazil. 
According to the authors also farm labour standards in Brazil deviate from international standards. In 
the field of animal welfare, animal health and plant health differences seem small and should not 
constitute substantial barriers to trade. 
 
 
4
  To lump different types of tariffs together (applied in many studies simulating the trade effect of import tariff reductions), 
specific tariffs are converted into ad valorem tariffs which means converting specific tariffs into an ad valorem equivalent 
by converting an absolute tax/duty per tonne or litre into a percentage of the value of the imported commodity. Specific 
duties are compared with unit values of imports within each tariff category. This is a common approach but prone to bias, 
among others due to which unit value is taken (a global or country specific one) and aggregation methods. See 
http://capreform.eu/will-the-right-tariff-average-stand-up/ for a discussion. Accessed April 2014. 
5
  UNCTAD provides a comprehensive classification of NTMs that distinguishes up to 14 types, see UNCTAD 2012. An 
overview of main categories is presented in the Appendix to this report. 
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 Table 3.3  
Country comparison of standards and enforcement of standards between the EU and Brazil. 
Standards related to  Comparison: standards applied in Brazil differ from EU standards by... 
Food safety • Types of permitted veterinary medicines. 
• Use of ractopamine as an additive in feedstuffs for pigs. 
• Approved genetically modified plants not (yet) approved in the EU. 
• Lack of enforcement of compliance with legislation concerning pesticide use, maintenance and 
sanitary issues in poultry and beef slaughterhouses and processing plants, and traceability of 
pigs. 
Environment • Less restrictive targeted measures to control pollution at source as part of a permit system for 
integrated production systems of poultry and pigs. 
Animal welfare • Due to the subtropical climate, basic welfare requirements are fulfilled on many farms even 
without legal standards. 
• Legislation provides basic welfare goals for farming, transport and slaughter. 
• Good Practice Recommendations have been or are being developed. 
• Group housing for pregnant sows is not required. 
Animal health • Overall equivalent guarantee of animal health as in the EU. 
• Great progress on traceability, but still enforcement issues due to insufficient inspection. 
Plant health • Overall equivalent guarantee of plant health as in the EU. 
Farm labour • Collective bargaining is not in line with ILO Convention. 
• The working day and week are longer than in the EU. 
• Forced and slave labour remain, despite efforts to improve. 
• Enforcement of labour standards is weak, but great progress is being made in inspections and 
effective penalties. 
Source: Van Wagenberg et al. (2012). 
 
 
Below we use information from the EU Market Access Database (MADB) to present SPS and TBT issues 
relevant to assess effects of a possible EU-Mercosur FTA. The MADB reports on the SPS and TBT issues 
in bilateral trade with third countries that are unresolved and thus hamper trade from the EU 
perspective. The overall aim of the MADB is to bring more transparency in trade issues facing EU 
exporters and to facilitate the efforts to resolve them. 
 
The MADB consists of two datasets: the trade barrier database and the SPS database.6 The trade 
barrier database defines seven categories of measures that relate to traditional trade policy 
instruments (tariffs and duties, trade defence instruments), other export-related measures 
(investment-related barriers, intellectual property rights, service-related and other measures) and 
NTMs. In both the trade barrier database and the SPS database, information is given according to type 
of measure, product and export destination. 
 
Several limitations of the MADB need to be considered. The database suffers selection bias in the 
reporting of the trade barriers (either by companies, their representative organisations or by 
government officials). Only reported trade barriers are included, listed after an evaluation by the EC. 
The MADB does not provide information on the importance of the trade barrier reported since 
information on the trade volume and/or value affected is not available. However, the information is 
useful to point out trade barriers relevant for EU exporters, indicating the difficulties that EU exporters 
6
  While overlapping to a certain extent, the trade barrier database and the SPS database report different types of 
information on NTMs from the EU exporters’ perspective. The trade barrier database collects complaints that individual EU 
exporters, groups or associations of producers or the EU member states report to the EC. Note that the complaints must 
clearly demonstrate evidence that the respective measure does not conform to international rules and causes commercial 
harm to European operations, either within the EU or in third countries. After an investigation by the EC, relevant 
measures are listed in the trade barrier database. In contrast, the SPS database is not based on individual complaints. 
The SPS database contains information reported by the agrifood industry, the EU member states, services and delegations 
of the EC, and also covers relevant SPS notifications from the WTO. 
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have been facing when supplying foreign markets. Table 3.4 presents an overview of SPS measures 
imposed by Mercosur countries on EU exports in the area of agrifood. 
 
 
Table 3.4  
Overview of NTM measures in the area of SPS imposed by Mercosur countries on EU exports, with 
barrier status ‘ongoing’. 
Title and  
barrier ID 
Product Measure/complaint Last update/check 
Argentina - Meat 
and meat products 
of ruminant 
(040010) 
Meat of bovine 
animals, frozen 
(HS 0202) 
Import restrictions on meat and meat products of 
ruminant origin because of BSE/TSE. This is against 
OIE recommendations 
Creation date: 
30/04/2004; 
Last update:04/06/2012 
Brazil - SPS - Partial 
alignment of BSE 
rules for the import 
of bovines and their 
products (115401) 
 Brazil imposes conditions for deboned beef, does not 
allow the imports of bone-in-meat, lists many 
materials as 'specific risk materials' (SRMs), and has 
set requirements for the approval of a specific 
system of removal of SRMs. 
Creation date: 
10/05/2011 
Last update: 
08/05/2014 
Brazil - SPS - Plants 
and plant products 
subject to PRAs 
(145477) 
Plants and plan 
products 
Pest Risk Analyses (PRA) are the main phytosanitary 
pre-requisite of MAPA to authorise imports into Brazil 
of plants and their products, and have been subject 
to serious delays - 10 years in some cases.  
Creation date: 
08/05/2014; 
Last update: 
01/12/2014 
Brazil - SPS - 
Verifications, 
labelling, pre-listing, 
regionalisation 
(095219) 
Agriculture The backlog of evaluations of the inspection and 
certification systems of EU Member States by the 
relevant services of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Food Supply of Brazil (DIPOA/MAPA) is 
a serious obstacle to trade. Many export applications 
have been submitted by EU Member States to MAPA 
from 3 to 7 years ago, and some of them even 
longer (up to 10 years). The European Commission 
has called Brazil to improve the level of 
predictability, to perform more visits to EU Member 
States and to shorten the delays between the visits 
and opening of markets 
Creation date: 
01/04/2009; last 
update: 04/12/2014 
Uruguay- Live 
ruminants, their 
products and 
derivatives 
(040084) 
Live bovine 
animals 
(HS 0102) 
The ban on beef due to Bovine Spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) is still in place. 
Creation date: 
18/05/20104; last 
update: 19/12/2014 
Uruguay-maturated 
pork meat products 
(040131) 
Meat of swine, 
fresh, chilled or 
frozen (HS 0203) 
Ban on Italian pork meat products with less than 400 
days of maturation due to animal health reasons 
(swine vesicular disease, classic swine fever) 
Creation date: 
29/09/2004; 
Last update 19/12/2014 
Source: EU Market Access Database (MADB): trade barriers and SPS issues, retrieved on 04/02/2015 from 
http://madb.europa.eu/madb/indexPubli.htm 
 
 
Besides SPS type of measures reported in the table above, several other technical barriers to trade 
and non-technical NTMs imposed by the four Mercosur countries restrict food exports from the EU. To 
date, measures that have an impact on bilateral trade in agrifood products with all four countries are 
‘registration, documentation and custom procedures’, ‘enforcement problems on IPR’ and the ‘lack of 
protection of Geographical Indications (GI)’. With respect to the export of food, the first and the third 
measures mentioned are the most relevant and merit some more clarification. 
 
With respect to ‘registration, documentation and customs procedures’, the EU exporters have 
indicated trade with Argentina is being affected by the country’s ‘sworn prior importer declarations’.  
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The barrier fiche in the EU’s MADB reports the following: 
‘Since 2012 importers have to submit for all envisaged imports a sworn declaration with 
product information to the Argentina’s taxation and customs authority AFIP. Some State 
agencies have access to this declaration and can raise objections. Importers need an 
approved import declaration to make the purchasing order and to transfer abroad foreign 
currency for the payment. The criteria for approval/rejection of the sworn declaration are 
not legally defined. These importer sworn declarations are part of a WTO dispute 
settlement case (DS438) since 2012. In order to avoid any interference with the on-going 
legal WTO process, the situation is described as known before the start of the WTO 
dispute settlement case’ (MADB website, retrieved 05/09/2014). 
The lack of clear criteria for approval of the requested declaration suggests this measure can be 
applied discretionally and can be easily used to prevent entry of foreign goods in order to defend 
domestic industry’s interests. 7 
With regard to the ‘lack of GI protection’, the MADB barrier fiche reports that 
‘Argentina has in place a legal framework in line with TRIPS including a sui generis 
protection by means of a national register that in principle is also available to foreign 
Geographic Indications (GI) holders. So far no EU GIs have been registered and therefore 
they lack legal means to be defended in Argentina. One of the reasons is that GIs 
denominations considered as ‘generic’ names cannot be registered and many European 
GIs are considered in Argentina as ‘generic’ and mentioned as such in the local food codex 
‘Codigo Alimentario’. There are concerns on misappropriation cases of certain European GI 
names.’ (MADB website, retrieved 05/09/2014). 
The lack of legal means to defend the names of EU quality agricultural products and foodstuffs holds 
for wine, spirits and a whole range of other food products such as cheeses, ham, sausages, olives and 
olive oils. 
The EU has marked a number of complaints of exporters as key priorities. In its bilateral trade 
relations with Argentina, out of the nine complaints, eight are marked as key, whereas 11 of the 
15 complaints with regard to Brazil are prioritised. None of the trade barrier issues with Paraguay and 
Uruguay have the status of key priority. 
7
 In January 2015 the WTO’s highest court confirmed that various ‘trade restricted requirements’ among which the 
advanced sworn import declaration are in violation of global trade rules. In the light of this ruling, Argentina will ‘work to 
establish terms of bilateral negotiations with the complainants’ one of them being the EU (Bridges Weekly, 2015:8). The 
WTO appellate body rule against Argentina may induce modifications in Argentina’s trade administration policies, although 
quick changes may not be expected seen the country’s response defending the declaration as a ’basic element that helps 
customs offices to guarantee protection of the domestic market’ (ibid).  
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4 Trade liberalisation scenario analyses: 
a review of literature 
4.1 Estimated trade and welfare gains of EU-Mercosur 
trade agreement scenarios 
A significant body of literature evaluates quantitatively the impacts of possible EU-Mercosur trade 
agreement scenarios on trade and welfare. Studies based on a CGE economic model (e.g. Kirkpatrick 
and George, 2009; Copenhagen Economics, 2011; Burrell et al., 2011; Philippides et al., 2014) 
generally show similar results of positive economic impacts on both sides.8 In terms of GDP growth, 
the estimates are more positive for Mercosur than for the EU because the EU’s economy is larger and 
Mercosur is a less important trade partner for the EU than the other way around. For the EU, the 
manufacturing and services sectors are predicted to gain relative to agriculture. The effect on EU 
agriculture is negative in the short term. However, in the long term, as sectorial resources shift to 
more efficient allocations, the welfare losses in agriculture are offset by the gains in other sectors of 
the economy. For the Mercosur countries, the sectorial changes indicated by the model simulations are 
generally in the opposite direction to those in the EU. This means that the agricultural and processed 
foods sectors in Mercosur countries are expected to benefit from the increased export opportunities in 
the EU market, whereas for the manufacturing sector, the increased exposure to European 
competition is expected to necessitate a period of adjustment for Mercosur producers. 
In conclusion, the model projections show that the economic losses and the adjustment pressures 
arising from a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and the countries of Mercosur would, as far 
as the EU is concerned, fall very heavily on the agricultural sector. Next, within the agricultural sector, 
effects differ between subsectors, with winners and losers. Studies showing these more sector detailed 
effects, indicate that EU producers of meat (particularly beef, but also poultry), sugar and dairy will 
face more competition on EU markets from Mercosur (Burrell et al., 2011; Philippides et al., 2014). As 
a result the share in intra-EU trade will decline and EU production of the agricultural commodities will 
be reduced. EU imports of vegetables and fruit from Mercosur will also be higher with trade 
concessions, dominated by the increase for citrus and the categories ‘other fruits’ and ‘other 
vegetables’. The most significant export gains are estimated for EU’s olive and olive oil sector. 
4.2 Trade friction costs and ‘behind-the-border’ measures 
as barriers to trade 
Whereas Burrell et al. (2011) and Philippides et al. (2014) only consider tariff rates or the reduction of 
tariff rates in their scenarios, Copenhagen Economics (2011) stresses that non-tariff barriers are 
reducing opportunities to trade between the EU and Mercosur countries importantly. Examples of such 
non-tariff barriers are cumbersome customs procedures or trade facilitation interventions (largely 
administrative trade barriers), and non-tariff measures (NTMs), such as product standards, conformity 
assessment regulations and subsidies (‘behind-the-border’ measures). Below, we first discuss trade 
costs estimates arising from customs procedures applied by Mercosur countries, and then evaluate the 
impacts of NTMs on agricultural trade with Mercosur in the next subsection. 
8
 In Rutten et al. (2011) literature on this topic published before 2011 is concisely summarised. The European Commission 
(2011) also did an evaluation of the impacts of 2008 offers on farm level. 
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4.2.1 Trade costs 
Table 4.1 presents the same indices Copenhagen Economics uses to indicate openness to trade and 
investments, with updated figures to show the Mercosur countries’ most recent rankings. The Trade 
Enabling Index provides an assessment of a country’s obstacles to trade.9 In 2014, the Mercosur 
countries are found in the lower part of the list, ranking the most open country first, except for 
Uruguay, which scores much higher in the list of 138 countries.10 The Ease of Doing Business Index 
reflects whether the regulatory environment in a country is conducive to starting and operating a local 
firm. Out of 189 countries, ranking the most business friendly country first, Argentina and Brazil 
ranked 124 and 120 respectively, with Paraguay and Uruguay around place 90 (in 2014). The Global 
Competitiveness Index summarises a set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level 
of productivity of a country and, consequently, the return obtained by investments. Here, Brazil scores 
relatively well in 2014, contrary to Argentina and Paraguay which rank 104 and 120 respectively out of 
144 (where the most competitive country is ranked first). The overall picture that emerges is that 
Mercosur is not very open to trade and investments, since it ranks poorly in these overall indices. 
Overall openness to trade and investment in Mercosur falls far behind other emerging economies like 
China and South Africa in most cases and is comparable to Russia and India (see Table 4.1). 
 
 
Table 4.1  
Overall indices of openness to trade and investments. 
 Trade enabling index Ease of doing business 
index 
Global competitiveness 
index 
 2014 2010 2014 2010 2014 2010 
Argentina 95 95 124 115 104 87 
Brazil 86 87 120 127 57 58 
Paraguay 113 103 92 106 120 120 
Uruguay 60 50 82 125 80 64 
       
Russia 105 114 62 123 53 63 
India 96 84 142 134 71 51 
China 54 48 90 79 28 27 
South Africa 59 72 43 34 56 54 
Source: WEF, The Global Enabling Trade Report ( 2010, 2014); WEF, The Global Competitiveness Report (2010, 2014) and World Bank Ease of 
Doing Business (2010, 2014). 
 
 
The reduction of costs in trade facilitation11 generally plays an important role in estimated welfare 
gains of a trade agreement, especially when longer term dynamic effects of the implementation of 
more efficient border measures are taken into account (e.g. George et al., 2009). The Mercosur 
countries will be able to capture these gains because they have made much less progress than the EU 
9
  The index framework captures the various dimensions of enabling trade, breaking them into four overall issue areas, 
which are Market access (on the extent and complexity of a country’s tariff regime), Border administration (about quality, 
transparency and efficiency of border administration), Infrastructure (availability and quality of transport infrastructure, 
associated services, and communication infrastructure, necessary to facilitate the movement of goods within the country 
and across the border) and Operating environment (measuring the quality of key institutional factors impacting the 
business of importers and exporters active in a country). 
10
 For comparison: The Netherlands ranks number 3, whereas 6 EU countries are in the top 10, and 22 EU member states 
ranking in the top 50 of this index. 
11
 Trade facilitation refers to policies and measures aimed at easing trade costs by improving efficiency at each stage of the 
international trade chain. According to the WTO definition, trade facilitation is the ‘simplification of trade procedures’, 
understood as the ‘activities, practices and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and processing 
data required for the movement of goods in international trade.’ The OECD follows the definition in its work on trade 
facilitation (OECD, 2014). Note also that the Trade Enabling Index, discussed above and explained in footnote 7, covers 
the aspects of border procedures and administration, infrastructure and the quality of institutions dealing with imports and 
exports (operating institutions). 
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in implementing efficient border procedures (e.g. reducing time spent on and number of border 
documents, improving logistics at ports). The EU will also benefit economically, mainly through 
improved performance of specific export industries and reduced costs of its own border procedures. 
The long term gain will, however, be smaller than in Mercosur, since EU-Mercosur trade is a smaller 
proportion of EU’s total trade. 
To illustrate the importance of reducing the costs of trade facilitation for agricultural goods, Liapis 
(2011) finds a statistically significant and negative association between time delays and agricultural 
trade, suggesting that a 10% reduction in export time is associated with a 9.6% increase in overall 
bilateral agricultural trade and a 17% increase in traded processed goods for the given country 
sample. A 10% improvement in import times, on the other hand, is associated with a 22% increase for 
overall agricultural trade. In a literature review of empirical studies on trade facilitation including a 
specific analysis for agricultural goods, OECD (2014) refers to a case study of an agro-business firm in 
Brazil that identified inadequate transport infrastructure as an important source of delays and 
increased operational costs, with delays at ports costing as much as USD25,000 per vessel per day. 
Improved infrastructure, hence, would significantly reduce trade costs. 
Table 4.2. below shows that it is rather costly to import goods in Mercosur countries. The average cost 
of importing a container in Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay is over USD2,200, much higher than in 
India and China. Custom procedures take quite some time, especially in Argentina and Paraguay, 
whereas importing to Brazil and Uruguay takes less than the average number of days it takes to 
import to the other BRICs. 
Table 4.2  
Overall indices of openness to trade and investments 
Cost to import (USD per 
container) 
Documents to import 
(number) 
Time to import (days) 
Argentina 2,260 8 30 
Brazil 2,215 8 17 
Paraguay 2,275 9 30 
Uruguay 1,125 7 16 
Russia 2,810 10 21 
India 1,250 11 20 
China 625 5 24 
South Africa 1,980 6 21 
WEF, Global Enabling Trade Report, 2014. 
4.2.2 Non-tariff measures and agricultural trade 
Administrative trade barriers are only part of the broad range of non-tariff barriers, which also include 
tariff rate quotas, import bans, product quality and food safety standards, licensing and many other 
regulatory measures (see for a categorisation of NTMs, UNCTAD, 2010. In Appendix 2, main headings 
of the NTM categories are summarised). Studies that propose to assess the impacts of a wider policy 
environment quantitatively use the ‘price gap’ (between domestic and world price) or ‘tariff equivalent’ 
methods which seek to estimate the level of ad valorem tariff that would have an equally trade-
restricting effect of the NTM in question. Alternatively, studies estimate ‘quantity gaps’ i.e. actual 
trade flows in the presence of the NTM less than expected trade flows (estimated by a statistical 
model of trade, such as a gravity model). 
In general, impacts of non-tariff measures on agricultural trade are considered to be serious (e.g. 
OECD, 2014). However, quantification of the impact of, for instance, SPS and TBT measures on trade 
and, hence, the estimation of the reduction of the costs to trade of such measures, is extremely 
complex, and appears to vary significantly across agricultural sectors and (specific) products. 
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Quantitative evaluations of NTMs’ impacts on overall trade costs of agricultural products show that 
agricultural trade is significantly more restricted than manufacturing trade which may be attributed to 
the perishability and higher level of regulations for food safety or food security reasons (Hoekman and 
Nicita, 2008, and Duval et al., 2012, in OECD, 2014). Nicita and Gourdon (2013) estimate that trade 
of more than 60% of food-related products are affected by at least one form of SPS measure.12  
 
There are only few studies that report quantitative estimates of impacts of NTMs on agrifood trade of 
Mercosur. Philippidis and Sanjuán (2007) calculate trade cost equivalent of Mercosur NTMs following 
the method of estimating tariff equivalents of NTMs and using a gravity model specification on EU-
Mercosur trade in 16 sectors. Tariff costs equivalents (TCEs) express the cost impact of cross-border 
trade of NTMs. The study finds that NTMs are particularly damaging to EU exports of beverages and 
tobacco to Mercosur where the NTMs pose an additional cost for EU exporters equal to 160%. NTMs 
also play an important role in EU exports of livestock (113%), vegetables, fruits and nuts (79%), 
other food products (63%) and dairy (45%) (see Figure 4.1). Note that trade costs in the bilateral 
trade of Mercosur countries importing from the Rest of America is higher in most cases than Mercosur 
importing from the EU. Trade costs faced by Mercosur exporters at the EU border (EU15/Merc in the 
figure) appear to be higher than the other way around for vegetables, dairy, sugar and beverages & 
tobacco. These figures indicate that trade costs are an important factor in bilateral trade between the 
EU and Mercosur, as well as in Mercosur’s trade with other countries at the American continent. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 NTM trade cost tariff equivalents (tariff as % of the value of the product) in bilateral 
trade. Source: Philippides and Sanjuan, 2007 (only results for agricultural sectors are presented). 
Notes: first region mentioned is the importer, second region is the exporting region: Merc/EU = 
Mercosur is importing from the EU); RoAC = rest of America. 
 
 
UNESCAP (2012) has developed an extensive database of agricultural trade related costs, measuring 
among others transportation costs, policy barriers (tariffs and non-tariff measures), information costs 
and contract enforcement costs. Bringing all these cost items together under one heading, UNESCAP 
estimates the agricultural trade costs between the EU and Mercosur to be as high as a tariff equivalent 
of 259% (average 2007-2009). If the costs of tariffs would be excluded, the agricultural (non-tariff) 
12
 However, the expected impact of standards on agricultural trade is not necessarily clear. On the one hand compliance 
with standards may lead to increased production costs which reduce trade, while on the other, standards may also 
increase information on food safety and product quality which can lead to increased consumer confidence, reduce 
transaction costs and thus facilitate trade. 
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trade costs between the EU and Mercosur would be 239%, implying that non-tariff trade costs are by 
far more important than tariffs. A further specification of the determinants of the non-tariff trade costs 
goes as far as indicating the importance of distance, infrastructure or access to information (ICT) 
whereas the factor of ‘non-tariff measures’ is not itemised. 
 
The latter makes it difficult to move from estimates of tariff equivalents or trade costs to 
recommendations to policymakers. In reality, trade is affected by a set of non-tariff measures, such as 
for instance by a technical standard, a phytosanitary limitation and slow customs procedures. When 
there are multiple NTMs in place, it is natural for policymakers to want to know which are more 
restrictive or more important, in order to prioritise policy efforts and target interventions to the most 
severe problems first. However, price gaps nor quantity gaps in the presence of multiple NTMs can be 
specified into individual and specific impacts of a measure on the distortion: there is only one price 
and/or quantity gap and further information to identify these gaps lacks. 
 
In an effort to tackle this problem, Ferrantino (2012) introduces a method to specify NTMs by studying 
goods as they move through supply chains. The idea is to follow a typical exported good from its 
location of production (ex-farm or ex-factory) through multiple steps in the process of shipping and 
delivery. At each stage in the process the price of the good increases, as additional costs are imposed. 
As a result, costs associated with each move through the supply chain can be separated into their 
constituent parts. Ferrantino states that 
 
‘With a supply-chain decomposition, it would be in principle possible to identify where the 
greatest rents and inefficiencies are, and to identify policy priorities which are most likely 
to expand trade and benefit both producers and consumers of traded goods’ (2012: 7). 
 
Typically, Ferrantino’s approach could be used in a case study following a particular good through 
various stages of the supply chain, but this approach also assumes that mark-ups along the supply 
chain can be attributed to tariffs, NTMs and other natural barriers such as different languages, 
information costs and/or transaction costs associated with using different currencies, all step-specific 
in the supply chain. 
 
In the following chapter we present a number of case studies of Dutch supply chains that are of 
particular interest in EU-Mercosur trade negotiations. Unfortunately, we are unable to follow 
Ferrantino’s approach in these case studies due to a lack of quantitative information. However, the 
case studies are conducted along Ferrantino’s line of thought by pointing out the most important non-
tariff measures identified in different stages of the supply chain in question. 
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 5 Trade effects of harmonising non-
tariff measures: case studies 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents three sector case studies on Dutch agrifood commodities that are important in 
terms of their external market orientation: fruit and vegetables, dairy and meat. These case studies 
zoom in on the offensive and defensive interest of these sectors in the negotiations with Mercosur on 
a trade agreement. Issues that currently hamper exports are highlighted and expected benefits of 
eliminating trade barriers are estimated. Defensive interests are discussed and possible implications of 
further increasing market access to the EU are indicated. 
5.2 Case study on fruit and vegetables 
5.2.1 Obstacles in bilateral trade 
Up to now there has been little trade by Dutch exporters of fruit and vegetables with Mercosur 
countries. Export figures indicate that total value adds up to no more than €13m in recent years, 
almost all of which consist of exports of onions and seed potatoes (see Table 5.1). 
 
The major reason Dutch companies have had little success entering markets in Latin America is the 
difficulty to get in.13 Major LA countries like Brazil, Argentina and Mexico require a pest risk analysis 
(PRA)14, a thorough procedure focusing on phytosanitary standards and requirements set and applied 
by the countries concerned. With a PRA, importing countries aim to rule out the import of plant 
diseases and to secure food safety at their domestic market. The PRA procedure can take quite some 
time. For example, several years ago, the Dutch authorities decided to select pears for starting a PRA 
procedure, as two Dutch exporters of pears indicated to have been approached by potential clients in 
Brazil. Market access for pears to Brazil has been approved in January 2015, three years after the PRA 
process started.15  
 
Brazil is very concerned about fruit moth and requests guarantees that all fruit is absolutely free of 
fruit moth. This requires huge efforts of growers’ management skills. Dutch authorities have agreed to 
apply a protocol that should prevent exports of pears that cannot comply with Brazil’s stringent 
requests. One element in the protocol is physical inspections at the growers’ plot or at the export 
customs clearance. This is, however, labour intensive and hence cost increasing. 
 
Currently, some South-European countries do have access to Brazil to export fruit and vegetables. 
Yet, Brazil treats every EU member state separately implying that each member state has to apply for 
market access for its own domestic industry. Moreover, the PRA procedure can only be applied to one 
product at the time, obliging the applicant to make a careful choice for which product ones want to 
start the procedure. 
 
13
 This part of this subsection builds on an interview with FrugiVenta’s Inge Ribbens (30 October 2014). 
14
 Pest risk analysis (PRA) is the process used by a national plant protection organization (NPPO) as the technical 
justification for phytosanitary measures. PRA is defined by the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) as ‘the 
process of evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether a pest should be regulated 
and the strength of any phytosanitary measures to be taken against it.’ The process requires a risk assessment to 
characterize the risk and risk management to determine appropriate measures. 
15
 The Normative Instruction no 2 of 16 January 2015 has been made public in the Dario Official on 20 January 2015. The 
negotiation with Mexico are even more tough than with Brazil, as it has been over six years since the Netherlands applied 
for access to Mexico for Dutch pears, and this is still under negotiation. 
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Although fruit and vegetable export to the Latin American continent is still very small, these markets 
are increasingly on the radar of Dutch fruit and vegetable exporters. Exporters are continuously 
looking for opportunities, but the Russian sanctions introduced in August 2014 have emphasised the 
necessity to seek alternative markets. Currently, options are explored to export apples and pears to 
Columbia and onions to Costa Rica. But the sector is also looking for other far distance markets with 
good prospects, such as for instance China. In 2014 market access for Dutch pears to China has been 
arranged (after five years of negotiations), while talks on market access for peppers only started 
(Chinese authorities also consider only one product at the same time when negotiation market 
access). In case market access talks with China (or other trade partners) will develop more successful 
than with Mercosur, interests of traders in the latter may fade. 
 
An FTA with Mercosur should lead to a smoother process of the procedures arranging market access. 
For fruit and vegetables this is the PRA procedure. The question is whether an FTA is a condition for a 
shorter lead time of PRAs; for the time being, pushing for more rapid consideration of applications on 
bilateral terms seems to be a more effective way than waiting for an FTA, something which is not 
expected to be concluded shortly. 
5.2.2 Bilateral trade and Mercosur’s overall trade in fruit and vegetables 
Table 5.1 below presents figures on fruit and vegetable exports of the EU and the Netherlands to each 
of the Mercosur countries. The export values are particularly low, except for exports of fruits (in 
particular apples [HS0808] and apricots [HS0809]) from the EU that amounted to €110m in 2012 and 
2013. The Dutch share in total EU fruit exports is negligible, while its share is significant in EU’s total 
export of vegetables to the four Mercosur countries. 
 
 
Table 5.1  
EU27 and the Netherlands’ exports of fruit and vegetables to Mercosur countries, 2012 and 2013, 
value in €1,000. 
 Fresh vegetables (HS07)  Fresh Fruits (HS08) 
 2012 2013  2012 2013 
 EU NL EU NL  EU NL EU NL 
Argentina 533 141 671 220  3,494 142 3,624 20 
Brazil 33,359 8,866 37,756 13,259  107,200 236 105,023 175 
Paraguay 1 0 19 0  8 16 35 0 
Uruguay 1,260 408 2,279 824  1,224 0 1,372 2 
Total 35,153 9,415 40,725 14,303  111,926 394 110,054 197 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
Table 5.2 below shows exports and imports of fruit and vegetable products by Mercosur countries. 
These figures indicate that Argentina is a net exporter of vegetables whereas Brazil is an even greater 
net-importer of these products, especially of onions and dried vegetables, two vegetables Argentina 
exports to a great extent. No surprise that these two products are traded between the two countries. 
The two smaller countries Paraguay and Uruguay are also net importers of vegetables. In case of 
fruits, Argentina is - again - the largest net-exporter within the Mercosur market, with Brazil’s trade 
balance showing a small export surplus. The most significant fruit exports are citrus fruit, apples/pears 
for Argentina, nuts, dates etc., and melons for Brazil and citrus fruit for Uruguay. Argentina’s major 
import item is bananas, whereas Brazil imports (largely) apples/pears, grapes and other nuts. In the 
category of prepared and processed vegetables, fruits, nuts or other parts of plants (HS20 - at the 
bottom of the table), both Argentina and Brazil are significant (net)exporters. Major export products of 
Argentina are groundnuts/peanuts and (grape) juices, whereas Brazil major export item in this 
category is orange juice. Brazil also imports prepared/preserved potatoes and olives, amounting 
together more than USD0.5bn in 2013. 
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 Table 5.2 
Total export and import of Vegetables and Fruits (fresh and prepared) by Mercosur countries, 2013 (in 
USDm). 
 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
HS code and abridged product name Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import 
0701 Potatoes, fresh 11.3 0.2 0.9 12.7 0.0 2.2 0.1 4.1 
0702 Tomatoes, fresh 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.2 
0703 Onions, shallots, etc. 226.0 0.5 1.2 328.4 0.0 5.2 0.2 3.7 
0704 Cabbages, etc. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
0705 Lettuce 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 
0706 Carrots, etc. 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 
0707 Cucumbers and gherkins, fresh or chilled. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
0708 Leguminous vegetables 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0709 Other vegetables, fresh or chilled. 6.9 2.2 1.3 4.8 0.0 0.7 0.1 1.9 
0710 Vegetables, frozen. 0.7 2.3 0.0 23.3 0.0 0.7 0.1 2.9 
0711 Vegetables provisionally preserved 3.3 0.1 1.7 30.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0712 Dried vegetables 4.4 7.8 1.2 53.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 3.1 
0713 Dried leguminous vegetables,. 197.1 3.5 24.6 342.5 0.5 0.2 0.0 4.7 
0714 Manioc, arrowroot, etc., 0.1 0.0 5.4 1.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 
 07 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 451.9 17.0 36.8 797.6 1.8 11.8 0.5 21.7 
          
0801 Coconuts, Brazil nuts and cashew nuts 0.0 6.6 156.1 47.8 0.0 0.3 0.1 2.4 
0802 Other nuts. 11.9 17.8 6.0 100.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 3.2 
0803 Bananas 0.0 194.6 35.6 0.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 20.4 
0804 Dates, figs, etc. 1.2 28.5 164.1 3.2 0.8 0.2 0.0 1.5 
0805 Citrus fruit, fresh or dried 335.7 2.4 84.6 23.9 0.4 3.2 79.6 1.1 
0806 Grapes, fresh or dried 102.8 0.3 103.0 116.6 0.0 0.7 0.0 2.1 
0807 Melons and papayas 0.0 0.3 205.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 
0808 Apples, pears, quinces 579.5 0.5 62.9 291.8 0.0 2.9 1.1 2.6 
0809 Apricots, cherries, etc. 17.8 0.1 0.0 94.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.2 
0810 Other fruit, fresh 87.4 15.6 1.4 43.1 0.0 0.1 16.3 2.5 
0811 Fruit and nuts, uncooked  17.3 2.6 10.9 19.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 
0812 Fruit and nuts, provisionally preserved  0.3 0.6 1.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0813 Fruit, dried, other than that of headings 
08.01-.06 
94.2 0.6 4.1 48.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
0814 Peel of citrus fruit etc.  0.0 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.9 0.0 0.2 0.0 
08 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons 
1248.2 270.6 837.1 789.6 7.9 8.6 97.9 39.1 
         
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruits, nuts, etc. 1286.7 117.5 2544.2 655.1 8.5 42.4 8.1 89.4 
Source: UNCOMTRADE. 
 
 
5.2.3 Trade opportunities for Dutch traders in fruits and vegetables 
Import tariffs on vegetable products range between 0 and 10% (at the 6-digit level) for all four 
Mercosur countries with a few exceptions: Brazil charges 55% on coconuts (HS 080111) and 35% on 
garlic (HS 070320), whereas Argentina charges 25% import tariff for garlic. The Mercosur countries do 
not charge any specific tariff and do not apply a tariff-rate quota system in their import regime for 
fresh fruit and vegetables. For prepared/preserved vegetables and fruits, ad valorem import rates are 
generally between 14 and 18% (MFN applied rates), whereas no tariffs are imposed on imports from 
Mercosur partner countries, whether this is a fresh or prepared/preserved fruit or vegetable product. 
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Despite the preferential treatment countries in the region benefit, Dutch traders do not consider 
import tariffs as a major problem for entering the Mercosur countries. When we interviewed six 
traders for this study, they confirmed the market access problem is largely the PRA procedure. They 
emphasised that a trade agreement should contribute in the first place to reduce the time and costs 
related to the PRA procedures and protocol specifications that are necessary to allow exports to Brazil 
and Argentina. The interviewed traders identified export opportunities for fruit (especially apples and 
pears) as West-European production seasons are complementary with those in the Southern 
Hemisphere and consumption grows, in particular in Brazil. 
 
However, Dutch traders are also actively looking for other opportunities to import products from 
Mercosur countries to source EU countries and beyond (e.g. re-export to Russia). EU import tariffs of 
fruits depend on the calendar (highest in EU’s production season), with significant tariff rates for, 
among others, grapes, citrus, mangos and melons. Meanwhile, EU imports from other countries in the 
Southern Hemisphere such as South-Africa and Chili have been granted zero rates. The result is that 
fruits from Mercosur countries have difficulties in competing on the EU market. Additional factors 
limiting Argentina’s competitive position are the overvaluation of its currency (the government resists 
devaluing the peso against the USD despite 30% inflation in 2014) and export taxes on important food 
commodities (aiming at sufficient domestic supply and low local prices). 
 
Table 5.3 below provides an overview of EU and Dutch imports of fruits and vegetables form Mercosur 
countries. Imports of vegetables are particularly low, yet the import value of fruits amounts to €1bn 
for the whole EU27, of which Dutch imports take about 40%, indicating that the Netherlands is an 
important importer and transit harbour to other EU countries and beyond of fruit from Mercosur. 
Imports are mainly tropical fruits like dates, figs, mangos (HS0804), citrus (HS0805), grapes 
(HS0806) and melons (HS0807).  
 
 
Table 5.3  
EU27 and the Netherlands imports of fruit and vegetables from Mercosur countries, value in €m. 
 Fresh vegetables (HS07)  Fresh Fruits (HS08) 
 2012 2013  2012 2013 
 EU NL EU NL  EU NL EU NL 
Argentina 165.6 15.1 94.2 16.5  416.6 158.6 489.3 184.3 
Brazil 4.4 0.9 3.2 0.7  585.0 283.2 611.0 293.5 
Paraguay 0.01 0.0 0.1 0.02  1.2 0.02 1.6 0.0 
Uruguay 1.2 0.02 0.3 0.02  54.3 19.6 61.7 22.0 
Total 171.1 16.0 97.7 17.2  1,057.2 461.3 1,163.6 499.8 
Source: Eurostat 
 
5.3 Case study on dairy16 
5.3.1 Current bilateral trade relations and Mercosur’s trade position in dairy 
products 
Exports of dairy products from Netherlands to Brazil and Argentina has been only €8m and €1.2m 
respectively in 2013. For the EU, these figures were €33m and €3m respectively. Cheese is the largest 
category (see Table 5.4). Another important EU export product is whey. 
 
 
16
 This section benefits from interviews with Jan Maarten Vrij (NZO, 6 November 2014) and Wim Kloosterboer (KFC, 
28 January 2015). 
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 Table 5.4  
EU27 and the Netherlands’ exports of dairy products to Mercosur countries, 2013, value in €m. 
 Netherlands EU27 
 Total dairy exports Of which cheese Total dairy exports Of which cheese 
Argentina 1.2 0 3.3 0.7 
Brazil 8.0 7.3 33.5 23.3 
Paraguay 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Uruguay 0.4 0.2 2.0 1.1 
Total 9.6 7.5 38.9 25.2 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
The interest of Dutch and other EU companies in exporting dairy products to Latin America is slowly 
increasing, as this continent is considered a growing market for dairy products.17 Argentina has well-
known favourable natural conditions for dairy production, making it very attractive to local and foreign 
investment. The country might have opportunities to expand its dairy production and increase its net-
export position18, but internal policies (especially the on-and-off implementation of export bans or 
taxes)19 are not supportive to a medium or long-term investment strategy. Farmers switch easily from 
milk production to soya production if soya bean prices are more attractive. Milk processors are 
therefore hesitant to invest in expanding processing capacity due to this rather opportunistic 
behaviour of farmers (and policymakers). 
 
Brazil shows an increasing consumption of dairy products. Milk production is increasing, yet imports 
are expected to continue in the near future, although these levels of imports (and exports) are modest 
(see Table 5.5). Typically, packaged UHT milk imports are sold by companies from Argentina and 
Uruguay with commercial interests in Brazil. Brazil also imports a significant volume of powdered milk, 
mainly from Argentina. With respect to import tariffs, rates are imposed on cheese, butter and milk 
powder in the range of 16 to 28%, but imports from Mercosur countries are duty-free, offering 
preferential access to its neighbouring countries. Trade figures (not presented) show that Argentina 
and Uruguay are Brazil’s main sourcing countries for dairy products, accounting for about 80% of 
Brazil’s dairy import value. The US is a competitive supplier of dairy ingredients, such as concentrated 
whey powder and lactose (USDA/FAS, 2014b). Imports from the EU are mainly cheese (as Table 5.4 
above shows), which is about 20% of Brazil’s total cheese imports in 2013. 
 
 
17
 For example: Friesland Campina has opened a sales office in Sao-Paolo recently to explore the local market in Brazil. This 
shows the ambition of this company to expand its presence at this market. 
18
 According to USDA/FAS (2014a) estimates approximately 25% of total milk output will be exported, primarily in the form 
of whole milk powder (WMP) and cheese. In 2014, Argentina’s main markets were Algeria, Venezuela and Brazil. Cheese 
was mainly shipped to Russia, followed by Brazil and Venezuela.  
19
 Export taxes were eliminated in 2009 but in September 2013 the GOA announced that the use of export permits (ROE) 
previously required for just a few products, are now mandatory for most of the dairy products (USDA/FAS, 2014a). 
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 Table 5.5  
Mercosur countries’ exports and imports of dairy products, 2013 (in USDm). 
 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
 Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import 
0401-Milk and cream, not concentrated etc. 3.2 0.0 16.3 12.9 2.0 1.1 22.2 0.0 
0402-Milk and cream, concentrated etc. 951.6 3.9 58.3 327.7 8.7 5.9 458.8 2.9 
0403- Buttermilk, etc. 6.2 0.0 2.7 6.6 0.1 1.2 12.8 6.8 
0404 Whey 152.8 3.1 0.1 53.3 0.0 0.1 25.2 0.6 
0405 - Butter etc. 79.4 4.3 3.3 19.1 1.8 0.4 103.4 2.6 
0406 - Cheese and curd. 256.2 15.7 13.1 166.0 1.3 12.2 251.5 6.0 
0407 Birds' eggs 0.0 0.0 60.9 20.0 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.2 
0408 - Birds' eggs, not in shell 16.3 0.6 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 
0409 - Natural honey. 212.6 0.1 54.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.0 0.0 
0410 - Edible products of animal origin, n.e.s. 0.3 0.2 10.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 
Total 1678.7 27.9 222.1 605.8 13.9 26.8 913.0 20.6 
Source: UNCOMTRADE 
 
5.3.2 Trade obstacles and expectations when measures hampering trade are 
eliminated 
Entering Brazil with dairy products is, however, tough and not only because neighbouring countries 
may be more competitive as they are near and benefit from zero import tariffs. Brazil applies stringent 
food safety requirements, which refers to two issues. One is that product labels have to comply with 
Brazil’s requirements. Approval of labels (description of what is in the product, what is the origin of 
ingredients) results in a listing of companies that are potentially eligible for exporting to Brazil. This 
procedure can take about 3-4 months. Once on the export list, the companies are inspected 
thoroughly; that is, the plant where products for exports are produced is visited by a Brazilian 
inspection team. Requirements are checked on the spot and procedures should be followed to the 
letter as described in the Brazilian law. These checks are repeated and executed by the Dutch COKZ 
(Dutch controlling authority for milk and milk products) four times a year, as agreed in a bilateral 
inspection protocol. 
 
By following this procedure, Brazil indicates not to recognise EU’s dairy quality system. In the EU, 
companies that comply with EU dairy quality and food safety (health) standards are eligible for 
exporting from the EU perspective. Brazil’s recognition of the EU dairy quality system would effectively 
mean the elimination of the country’s companies’ list of eligible EU exporters, and hence the onerous 
and time consuming inspections at the companies’ premises. 
 
The Dutch dairy industry is positive towards negotiating improved market access with Mercosur as it 
believes it would increase opportunities for exports to these countries. Although tariffs are still 
important (import tariffs imposed on cheeses range between 12 and 28% depending on the type) and 
elimination would certainly help create export opportunities, the trade negotiations should focus on 
reducing NTMs. This position is in line with the EUcolait position paper (released 19/05/2015), in which 
the European Association of Dairy Trade pleads for the ambitious SPS/TBT chapter to deal with Brazil’s 
complicated procedure of approval of exporting plants and system of approving packing and labelling 
and with Argentina’s ‘sworn prior importer declaration’. All these measures are considered as 
hampering exports to these markets Similar issues of major concern in the bilateral negotiations as far 
as dairy products are concerned are raised by the European Dairy Association (in which processing 
companies are allied) in its letter to the EU Commission (EDA, 2014). 
 
A FTA and a more balanced level playing field may indeed offer the dairy industry increasing export 
opportunities to Brazil. A competitiveness assessment based on five economic indicators shows that 
the Dutch dairy industry performs better than the dairy processing industry in Brazil. Figure 5.1 below 
(from Van Berkum et al., 2014) builds on two trade performance indicators (a Relative Trade 
Advantage indicator and world market shares) and three economic performance indicators (shares in 
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added value in the food industry, and growth in added value and labour productivity) for 
benchmarking the Dutch dairy industry against the industry in other major dairy exporting countries 
and Brazil (see Appendix 3 for more explanation of the indicators). The overview indicates that where 
the overall competitiveness (O) of the Dutch dairy processing industry shows to be the strongest of all 
countries presented, the dairy industry in Brazil is not competitive at all. The Dutch dairy industry’s 
positive evaluation is largely due to its high score on economic performance indicators, whereas on 
trade indicators the Dutch industry finds itself close to the average. The latter result is due to declining 
export market shares. For Brazil, the picture is the opposite: scores are highest on trade indicators, 
yet below average on labour productivity (L), value added growth (P) and value added share (S). The 
overall picture of the competitive position of Brazil’s dairy sector, though, is not positive. This position, 
and an improved market access to Brazil following from a trade agreement that includes smoother 
label and export licensing approval procedures, would provide a positive prospect of export 
opportunities to this large Mercosur member. Of course, EU dairy supply still has to compete with 
products from neighbouring countries Argentina and Uruguay, Brazil’s current major suppliers of dairy 
imports. 
 
 
 
Legend:  
O Overall competitiveness 
S Annual growth of the share of the dairy industry in the added value in manufacture industry (2001-2011); US (2002-2011) & Brazil (1999 -
2011) 
T Difference RTA indicator (2000 - 2012) 
M Difference world market share 2011 minus 2000 
L Annual growth rate labour productivity (2001-2011); US (2002-2011) & Brazil (2005-2011 
P Annual growth rate real added value (2001-2011); US (2002-2011) & Brazil (1999-2011 
Figure 5.1  Competitiveness of the dairy industry. 
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 5.4 Case study on meat 
Bilateral trade flows of meat and meat products indicate that the EU is an important importer of both 
meat commodities (HS02) and prepared meats (HS16) from Mercosur. Trade figures show that meat 
exports from the EU to Mercosur always have been rather modest, adding up to merely €16m for meat 
commodities and €14m for meat preparations in 2013. Imports, however, amounted to €2.4bn, of 
which €1.7bn for meat commodities and €700m for meat preparations. Table 5.6 presents the 
volumes of imports of meat (products) by the Netherlands and the EU in 2013 (including imports of 
the Netherlands), and the sourcing Mercosur countries. The table shows that in terms of volume 
imports are mainly beef (HS0201 and 0202) and different kinds of poultry meat (HS0207, natural; 
HS0210, poultry meat salted; and HS1602, poultry meat preparations). The main supplier is Brazil, as 
figures in the table indicate. 
 
 
Table 5.6 
Imports of meat (HS02 and HS16) by the Netherlands and EU27/28, in volume (1,000 tonnes), 2013. 
 Netherlands  EU 27/28 
HS code and shortened product name Brazil Uruguay Argentina Brazil Uruguay Argentina 
0201 Bovine, fresh/chilled 9.9 8.0 9.4 24.3 19.5 32.3 
0202 Bovine, frozen 8.3 2.7 0.6 41.1 19.9 2.3 
0204 Sheep or goat meat 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.9 0.7 
0205 Meat of horses, etc. 0.1 1.0 0.5 1.3 1.7 6.8 
0206 Edible offal of bovine etc. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
0207 Meat and edible offal of fowls  40.5 0.0 2.4 106.1 0.0 8.3 
0208 Meat and edible offal of rabbits etc. 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.1 1.2 
0210 Meat and edible offal, salted, etc. 119.9 0.0 0.0 170.9 0.0 0.0 
        
1601 Sausages etc. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1602 Prepared or preserved meat 90.2 0.0 1.3 226.5 0.1 3.9 
1603 Extracts and juices of meat, etc. 0.6 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 
1604 Prepared or preserved fish 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.5 
1605 Crustaceans, etc. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
Export competitiveness in the meat industry is affected by several factors, including cost of 
production, product differentiation, market access, transportation and exchange rates. Taking all these 
factors into account, the EU meat industry may have both offensive and defensive interests in trade 
talks with Mercosur.20 Offensive interests point at export opportunities that, although they may not be 
large, are identified for pig meat and veal. Exports of pork or certain parts of pork heavily depend on 
price developments, as in ‘normal’ circumstances EU/Dutch supply is not price competitive at the 
Brazilian market (see Hoste, 2013). However, in 2014 hog prices in Brazil achieved record levels, with 
pork prices exceeding EU average prices. Increasing exports to Russia was the main driver behind this 
price development.21 Whether this situation lasts depends on the continuation of the Russian import 
bans against the EU, US and other countries, and the Russian import demand for pork (affected by 
domestic price and exchange rate developments). More than pork, probably, veal exports to Brazil - a 
Dutch offensive interest in particular - would be a promising opportunity as it is in demand by Brazilian 
restaurants . Veal remains a niche market prospect (high quality market segment, hotels and 
restaurants) and exports will probably not be more than a few thousand tonnes a year. However, 
20
 Industry insights are based on an interview with Frans van Dongen (COV), 28 November 2014. 
21
 See several news items on www.pigsite.com over the period August 2014 up to January 2015.  
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similar to pig meat, exports of only a small volume would imply better prices on the internal EU 
market. 
 
Officially, Brazil has lifted the BSE ban that used to block the export of beef and veal since the mid-
1990s. Yet, in order to allow for exports, Brazilian inspection needs to visit the companies in the EU to 
check whether they meet the veterinary requirements. Brazil claims its veterinary services do not 
have the human capacity to visit the EU companies soon and therefore in practice, exports are still 
blocked until the Brazilian authorities give priority to this matter. 
 
On the other hand, beef imports from Brazil are subject to stringent EU rules on Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD) control. Exports of beef are only allowed when meat is from animals from FMD free 
regions; animals from non-free FMD regions have to stay longer in quarantine before they can be sent 
to slaughtering houses and exported as meat to the EU. Since this rule was applied (2007/2008), 
Brazil’s exports of beef to the EU has declined from about 300.000 tonnes to around 150.000 tonnes. 
The EU applies a pre-listing system of exporting companies (the Brazilian authority provides export 
certificates), inspection of Brazilian companies takes place afterwards (once every two or three years). 
According to recent FVO reports, Brazil does not fully comply with EU rules with respect to holding 
registration, identification and registration of cattle and animal movement controls (ear tags). When 
the establishments were visited, the official controls found that microbiological testing of carcasses 
were still not in line with EU requirements requiring action at the Brazilian side to rectify the 
shortcomings identified (FVO, 2013). 
 
One could say that both sides would have an interest in improving market access for beef (and, hence, 
veal) to each other’s market. Obviously, beef exporters in the EU (Ireland, France) have a defensive 
interest, as lower import barriers would imply more competition on their traditional EU markets. The 
meat processing industry in some of the other EU countries, however, seems to be open to import 
parts of the animal (especially ‘front legs’) from Brazil and Argentina, and would welcome the option 
to import these parts from Latin America under improved conditions.22 
 
Other defensive interests in the EU are in the pork and poultry meat sector. Pork production in 
Mercosur countries is not very competitive at international markets, except for Brazil (USTRC, 2012). 
Exports from other Mercosur members than Brazil are non-existing, whereas Brazil is the world's 
fourth-largest producer and fourth-largest exporter of pork. Brazil’s main export destinations are 
Russia, Hong Kong and Singapore. Exports to the EU are non-existent due to the fact that the pork 
industry in Brazil produces pork with ractopamine, a feed additive that promotes feed efficiency. The 
use of ractopamine is not allowed in the EU, and imports of products produced with ractopamine are 
banned. Recently, Brazil claimed to produce ractopamine free pork. EU controls, however, still found 
a significant share of samples taken from pigs at slaughter to contain this substance, leading to the 
conclusion that the system in place is not yet sufficiently robust to guarantee that ractopamine is not 
being used (FVO, 2012). Meanwhile, Brazil has been able to increase exports to Russia in 2014 (after 
Russia  banned US pork on ractopamine concerns early 2013 and the import ban on EU pork since 
early 2014 due to African Swine Fever), claiming to produce and export ractopamine free pig meat to 
Russia. Nonetheless, if (more) Brazilian companies can comply with EU requirements to guarantee 
pork is being produced free of ractopamine, Brazil may be able to export to the EU.  
 
For poultry meat, the EU has clearly a strong defensive interest. Brazil is among the world’s leading 
poultry exporters (export value of USD7.2bn in 2013), besides the USA. Argentina is a large net-
exporter of poultry meat too (with an export value of around USD650m in 2013). Both Brazil and 
Argentina have low production and processing costs that contribute to their strong competitive 
position against the EU poultry industry. Among the European competitors, the Dutch industry is not 
doing badly (e.g. Van Horne, 2009; Van Horne and Hoste, 2013; and Van Horne and Bondt, 2013). 
22
 In the interview the business representative stated that the EU meat sector claims for all types of meat the sensitive 
product status when negotiating with third countries on market access. Therefore, the meat industry takes the position 
that the Commission should only offer zero duty tariff rate quotas (the volume to be negotiated) implying that out-of-
quota volumes will remain to be charged by existing import tariffs and duties. 
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A comparative analysis based on five indicators of competitiveness shows that the overall competitive 
position (O) of the Dutch poultry meat processing industry is above average of the benchmark 
countries (Van Berkum et al., 2014), performing better than the average EU27 and US poultry 
processing meat industry. However, Brazil appears to be by far the best performing country of the 
sample included in this study. Figure 5.2 shows that the Dutch poultry meat industry scores low on the 
two trade indicators, as it lost export share on the world market (M) and the Relative Trade Advantage 
(T) indicator deteriorated over time. By contrast, the Brazilian poultry industry performed very well on 
these indicators. Labour productivity (real value added per employee, indicator L) is highest in the 
Netherlands, with Brazil (and the US) showing a weak score on this indicator. Text box 5.1 below 
provides some more background information on the competitive strengths of poultry processing firms 
in Brazil and the Netherlands. 
 
 
Legend: 
O Overall competitiveness (Canada is omitted due to insufficient data) 
S Annual growth of the share of the meat industry in the added value in manufacture industry (2001-2011); US (2002-2011) and Brazil (1999-
2011) 
T Difference RTA indicator (2000-2012) 
M Difference world market share 2011 minus 2000 
L Annual growth rate labour productivity (2001-2011); US (2002-2011) & Brazil (2005-2011) 
P Annual growth rate real added value (2001-2011); US (2002-2011) & Brazil (1999-2011)  
Figure 5.2  Competitiveness of the poultry processing industry (NACE C1012). Source: Van Berkum 
et al. (2014). 
 
 
The EU’s poultry sector is protected with tariffs and import quotas with reduced import tariffs for 
(salted/cooked and natural) breast fillet. Table 5.7. below gives an overview of the quotas and import 
levies for some of the main poultry meat products. In order to show the extent these quotas are filled, 
also the EU’s import volumes in 2013 are reported. 
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Table 5.7 
Overview of EU quotas, imports in 2013 (both in tonnes) and levies of some poultry meat products. 
 Poultry meat  
salted  
Poultry meat  
preparations  
Poultry meat  
naturel  
Poultry meat  
preparations  
Turkey meat  
preparations  
HS code 0210.9939  1602.3219  0207.1410/50/70  1602.3230  1602.31xx  
ad 
valorem 
levy (%)  
15.4  8  6.4 10.9  8.5  
import 
levy in 
€/tonne 
1,300  1,024  1,024  1,024 1,024  
 Quota  Import Quota  Import Quota Import Quota Import Quota Import 
Brazil  170,807  170,698 79,477  53,789 11,932  63,638 62,905  50,145 92,300  63,387 
Thailand  92,610  51,419 160,033  164,396 5,100  6,779 14,000  13,920 0  0 
Other  828  60,118 11,443  282,264 3,300  574,013 2,800  80,670 11,596  49,890 
Total  264,245  282,235 250,953  500,449 20,332  644,430 79,705  144,735 103,896  113,277 
Source: Van Horne and Bondt (2013: Table 4.3), extended with 2013 EU import data by the author. 
 
 
Since the establishment of the import quotas in 2007, exports of Brazil to the EU of the poultry 
products mentioned in Table 5.7 are close to the in-quota tariff-free volume. The exception is the 
poultry meat natural (HS 020714) for which the EU grants Brazil a TRQ of only 12,000 tonnes: over 
the last six years (since 2007) EU27 registered imports varying between 60 and 100,000 tonnes 
(Eurostat trade statistics). This shows that import levies are not prohibitive and, hence, the TRQ is not 
binding for Brazil’s supply of this product. This corresponds with Van Horne and Bondt (2013) showing 
that even with the current substantial import levies, the price of breast fillet from Brazil and Argentina 
is below price levels EU producers offer. In case import levies would be reduced by 50% (one of the 
scenarios the authors apply) and no additional levy would be charged, Brazil and Argentina (in 
addition to the USA, Ukraine and Thailand) would enhance their already strong competitive position 
even more at the EU market. Because of the distance, imported meat from Brazil and Argentina is 
frozen and, hence should be used in processed products as frozen meat may not be defrosted and sold 
as fresh meat. Future market prospects of the EU poultry industry, therefore, are largely in the fresh 
meat segment certainly when non-EU suppliers would get improved access to the EU market.  
 
 
Textbox 5.1 Competitive strengths of Brazil’s poultry industry 
Brazil is among the largest broiler meat exporters of the world. An overview of the business activities of 
most of Brazil’s poultry producers and processors is provided by the Brazilian Chicken Producers and 
Exporters Association (ABEF, unknown year). They provide numbers on slaughters and employees but the 
stance of the ABEF on the companies is biased by their association status. The strengths of the industry 
are low production costs (labour, energy and feed), an integrated production chain and fast adoption of 
new technologies. Brazil is also the home of the world’s largest poultry processor: Brasil Foods, or BRF 
(Bell and Kindred, 2012). BRF, which also produces a whole range of non-meat convenience products, is 
the second largest employer in Brazil and the third largest exporter after the oil and mining industry. 
Almost 20% of these exports are distributed to Europe. 
Literature primarily focuses on cost advantages for poultry processing firms. However, since companies 
grow or merge continuously, a few large players process a large amount of poultry meat and thus, firm 
structure and performance might have important influences on their ability to compete. In looking mainly 
at financial and productivity measures, Böcker (2014) compared structures and performances of the 
poultry industry for 49 firms from 10 countries. Böcker finds that the two Dutch companies in his sample - 
Plukon and G.P.S. Nunspeet - generally show higher profitability results than their competitors, are 
flexible and efficient in selling and hence would be able to compete with European and non-European 
poultry producing firms. A study like this, focusing on firm specific features and performances is a 
welcome supplement to a broader sector or industry approach. 
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 6 Conclusions 
This study provides insights into the current trade relations in agrifood products between the EU and 
Mercosur and assesses the impacts of a possible trade agreement between the two blocs. Current 
trade relations show that overall, the EU’s comparative advantage is in industrial products whereas 
Mercosur countries have an interest in increasing access to the EU for agricultural products. 
Quantitative analyses of different sets of trade liberalisation scenarios show that whereas overall 
economic impacts are positive on both sides, economic losses fall heavily on the agricultural sector, as 
far as the EU is concerned. 
 
Those projected, overall negative effects for the agricultural sector in the EU resound in the position of 
the meat sector, especially in the poultry meat sector. Supply from Mercosur is quite competitive and 
may be expected to gain from any improved access to EU markets that may arise from a trade 
agreement, increasing adjustment pressures to the EU (Dutch) industry. Imports of meats from 
Mercosur, though, will be mainly in frozen form, which means that the main prospects for the Dutch 
industry lie principally in the fresh meat and quality segment. The Dutch fruit and dairy sector, on the 
other hand, considers export opportunities to increase in case the EU and Mercosur would agree on 
further opening up their respective markets. Current export opportunities of both sectors in Mercosur 
countries are greatly reduced by non-tariff measures and other trade friction costs. Hence, such non-
tariff trade barriers should be addressed as part of any such agreement. The fruit and vegetable sector 
is keen to find new markets for Dutch quality products but also to benefit from importing products 
from the Southern Hemisphere in order to enhance the position of Dutch traders sourcing Europe. 
Brazil (and Venezuela if it joins the negotiations) are net importers of dairy products. As consumption 
in these countries grows, the EU (Dutch) dairy industry may find important attractive markets once 
trade negotiations result in reducing the costs of the complicated procedures of export approval. 
 
All in all, negotiations on a trade agreement will need to focus in the first place on reducing the costs 
of non-tariff measures, as bringing back the divergence in standards and regulations, and harmonising 
and speeding up all activities around conformity assessment (testing, surveillance, inspection, 
certification and so on) would greatly decrease trade costs. These trade costs are currently significant, 
for both sides and for a range of agricultural products, and substantive gains may be achieved in this 
area. Yet, defensive interests predominate for some agrifood sectors in the EU. At the same time, 
Mercosur (Brazil) has a number of defensive interest in manufacturing, investment and public 
procurement (among others). Hence, a fully-fledged free trade agreement between the two blocs 
might not be realistic in reach in the short term. Messerlin (2013), identifying the most efficient 
instruments of negotiation, recommends to focus on mutual recognition, that is to agree on a joint 
process of mutual evaluation of regulations in question by the two parties. The aim of the process is 
not to impose one’s own version of regulations, but for partners to trust each other and their 
respective regulations to be able to recognise unconditionally the partner’s regulations. This may not 
sound very ambitious but could create some dynamics and establish trust among negotiators, 
business and consumers from all negotiating countries, which would allow for next steps to further 
cooperation and integration, and hence could be on the long term a successful strategy. 
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   Appendix 1
A1. Structure of Dutch agrifood exports to and imports from Third countries 
 
Figure A.1  Structure of the Dutch agrifood exports (left) to and imports (right) from Third Countries 
(non-EU-countries), 2013 (% of total Dutch agrifood export and import value). 
 
 
A2. UNCTAD classification of NTMs 
Table A.1 
Non-tariff measures according to the UNCTAD classification 
Technical NTMs A. Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures 
B. Technical Barriers to Trade measures 
Non-technical NTMs 
 
C. Pre-shipment inspections, formalities 
D. Price control 
E. Licences, quotas 
F. Charges, taxes and other para-tariffs 
G. Finance measures 
H. Anti-competitive measures 
I. Trade-related investment measures 
K. Distribution restrictions, restrictions on sales/services 
L. Subsidies (excluding export subsidies) 
M. Government procurement restrictions 
N. Intellectually property rights 
O. Rules of origin 
Source: MAST, NTM classification, available online under http://ntb.unctad.org. 
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A.3 Competitiveness indicators 
In Van Berkum et al. (2014) the following indicators to quantify the competitiveness of industry were 
selected: 
• Trade related indicators: 
­ Growth of the export share on the world market of a specific subsector of the food industry of the 
food industry as whole. The market share of one country is compare with the total world export of 
that (sub-) industry. This performance indicator reflects the outcome of the competitive process. 
­ The difference of the Relative Trade Advantage (RTA) index between 2 periods. The RTA is defined 
by Scott and Vollrath (1992) as the difference between the Relative Export Advantage (RXA) and 
the Relative Import Advantage index (RMA). A positive RTA indicates a competitive advantage: the 
exports exceed the imports. Negative values signify competitive disadvantages. In the report also 
the RXA and RMA will be presented, indicated whether the advantage is the result of higher export 
or lower imports.  
The flaw of the RTA is that re-export might suggest high competitiveness of one industry. These 
transit activities might be influenced by a good performance of another sector i.e. logistics or by 
beneficial natural and infrastructural conditions like sea or airports. 
• Economic performance measures: 
­ Annual growth of the value added of a specific industry in the total food industry. This reflects the 
competition for product factors between different industries within a country;  
­ Annual growth of the value added per employers as indicator for labour productivity. This affects 
the unit labour costs and in this way the relative prices. 
­ Annual growth of value added reflects the performance of that specific (sub-)industry. 
 
The methodology is based on annual growth percentages of the indicators, except for the trade 
indicators. In the latter we use the difference of the indicator outcomes between 2 periods. For 
instance, the market share in 2011 minus the market share in 2000. In Wijnands et al. (2007) raw 
materials as well as processed products are included in assessing the competitiveness of the food 
industry. Trade in raw material is a determinant of the competitiveness of the primary sector, while 
processed products are linked to the processing industry. This study will distinguish between 
processed and raw materials. The UNComtrade product codes are linked to the NACE industry codes. 
The revision envisages selecting only processed products from the trade database for assessing the 
food industry’s competitiveness for the ‘trade’ indicators. 
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